“…Moreover, human vaccination is becoming a less viable option to control poxvirus infections in today’s increasingly immunocompromised population, particularly with the emergence of HIV in Sub-Saharan Africa.
“An increased frequency of human monkeypox virus infections, especially in immunocompromised individuals, may permit monkeypox virus to evolve and maintain itself independently in human populations”.
The UK’s Health Security Agency (UKHSA) has procured more than 20,000 doses of a smallpox vaccine made by Bavarian Nordic, as cases of monkeypox rise in Europe and beyond, it said on Thursday.
The vaccine is being offered to identified close contacts of people diagnosed with monkeypox to reduce the risk of symptomatic infection and severe illness, UKHSA said in a Twitter post.
Today, I watched the video below by Dr.Rashid Buttar
Dr Rashid A Buttar | The Facts About Monkeypox You Didn’t Know
What is the big deal with the Monkey Pox? Should you take the Small Pox vaccine to protect yourself? Is this the newest “plandemic” or is there something more sinister that we need to know about? Get the answers on this video where Clay Clark and Dr Buttar discuss the MonkeyPox issue from a different perspective. And watch AmazingPolly’s 2nd video on Monkeypox.
In 2003, Dr Buller inserted an interleukin 4 (IL-4) gene into a mousepox virus, creating an antigen so lethal that it killed all of the mice that had been infected, even those that had been vaccinated and treated with antiviral drugs. It’d been surmised since the early 1990s that smallpox and other orthopoxviruses, like cowpox and monkeypox could be similarly weaponized.
In 2012, Dr Buller recommended against using the smallpox vaccine as a prevention against monkeypox in this paper, published by the NIH, writing:
“Human vaccination is becoming a less viable option to control poxvirus infections in today’s increasingly immunocompromised population, particularly with the emergence of HIV in Sub-Saharan Africa. An increased frequency of human monkeypox virus infections, especially in immunocompromised individuals, may permit monkeypox virus to evolve and maintain itself independently in human populations.”
Polly suggests that Dr Buller may have thereby committed a cardinal sin and in 2017, he was killed by a car impact during one of his daily bike rides.
The UK’s health agency is currently doing exactly what Dr Buller had recommended against: administering smallpox vaccines to those found to be the most at-risk of monkeypox, which is gay and bisexual men.
There’s lots more dot-connecting, here. She gets into how the Biden Regime’s Chief-of-Staff Ron Klain was the White House Coordinator for the 2014 ebola outbreak under Obama and how former CIA Director John Brennan oversaw and coordinated the White House response to SARS and H1n1 while serving at his previous appointed post as Deputy National Security Advisor for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism during the Obama administration.
On Friday, St. Louis University professor and bioterrorism expert, Robert Mark Buller, was killed while riding his bike in the 10600 block of Riverview Drive, in St. Louis. Buller, 67, was a professor in the department of molecular microbiology and immunology, and one of the nation’s foremost poxvirus researchers. He was also a member of “multiple national committees and governmental advisory groups, including some that advised the intelligence community on biodefense,” SLU said in its obituary of the professor.
Police said Buller was killed shortly before 6 p.m. on Friday, and pronounced dead at the scene. A man driving a Ford E-350 tried to pass Buller on the left, but when Buller swerved left, he and the Ford were hit by an oncoming car. He was set to retire in 2018.
His obituary said that his lab at SLU researched gene therapy, vaccines, and antiviral drugs as treatments for smallpox and a number of other lethal viruses. Buller studied ways to protect against viruses if they were used as weapons of bioterrorism. In fact, he was frequently sought after the 9/11 attacks raised concerns about whether or not the smallpox virus could be used as a biological weapon.
He was an active member of Our Lady of Lourdes parish in University City, volunteered with Habitat for Humanity, sponsored impoverished children in other countries, and often donated to Wounded Warriors. He was also devoted to his family, work, and God, and will be missed by his daughter Meghan and wife Joslyn.
Our thoughts are with his family.
You can hear both Polly and Dr. Buttar’s suspicions in their videos. Here, I have collected the main material that I gleaned from the Amazing Polly video.
Microbiologist Mark Buller says his only goal in creating a super-lethal virus was to make the nation safer from bioterrorism. Only by genetically engineering a “hotter” mousepox virus that could overcome existing vaccines and drugs, he says, could he devise new ways to combat even the most virulent disease.
“There’s no chance it can get out of the lab. It can’t infect humans. And it’s important work to protect the American people,” said Buller, a professor of molecular microbiology at Saint Louis University. What he can do with mousepox, terrorists might do with smallpox, and the country needs a way to respond, he said.
But since Buller revealed his experiments Oct. 22 at a bioterrorism conference in Geneva, some scientists have declared such research – which is proliferating as a result of the biodefense funding boom – counterproductive and potentially dangerous. Even if proper safeguards keep the germs in the lab, such experiments could pave the way for terrorists by pioneering new ways to make germs deadlier, they say.
“There’s no reason the United States should be funding basic research for terror,” said Richard H. Ebright, a Rutgers University biochemist who studies biosecurity. “That’s essentially what this is.”
Other experts worry that by deliberately engineering killer germs, even with good intentions, the U.S. government might provoke a biological arms race by feeding suspicions that the United States is covertly developing bioweapons.
“If we saw this work in any foreign program – if it was Iran, North Korea, Syria or Russia – we would say it’s evidence of an offensive biological weapons program,” said Milton Leitenberg, a veteran biological arms control expert at the University of Maryland.
In the face of such criticism, the White House issued an unusual defense of Buller’s work yesterday.
“We believe this research is critically important to the biodefense of the nation,” said Kathryn Harrington, spokeswoman for the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy. “The design of the work was appropriate, and it even included developing countermeasures” for the virus, she said.
But the concerns about Buller’s research apparently were enough to delay follow-up experiments by virologists Peter Jahrling and John Huggins at the Army’s biodefense research center at Fort Detrick in Frederick.
Buller said this week that the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases had agreed to carry out animal tests on cowpox virus altered to make it deadlier. But in a carefully worded statement, Fort Detrick spokesman Chuck Dasey said that no such testing has been scheduled.
“Dr. Jahrling and Dr. Huggins have been in contact with Dr. Buller, and samples of the [engineered mousepox and cowpox] virus have been sent to USAMRIID and archived,” Dasey said. “But right now there’s no approved protocol to do any testing with the viruses.”
He declined to say whether testing may be done in the future.
The question of controls on research and publications involving dangerous germs that might be used by terrorists is being vigorously debated in the U.S. government and at research universities.
In a major recent report, the National Academy of Sciences declared that biotechnology has created a “dilemma in which the same technologies can be used legitimately for human betterment and misused for bioterrorism.” It identified seven categories of “experiments of concern” requiring special scrutiny, including work to increase the virulence of a pathogen or to alter it to defeat vaccines or drugs – the kind of research Buller is performing.
But his work is far from the only high-tech biological experiment that has raised eyebrows.
Scientists at the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology in Washington have reconstructed genetic material from the influenza virus that caused the 1918 pandemic that killed more than 20 million people worldwide and inserted some of its genes into a contemporary flu virus for tests on mice.
Last year, scientists from the State University of New York at Stony Brook created an infectious polio virus from scratch using information available on the Internet and DNA material bought by mail order.
With the National Institutes of Health biodefense research budget up six-fold since 2001, more and more scientists are conducting such experiments.
“Unfortunately the large expansion of biodefense research is going to expose many vulnerabilities,” says Rutgers’ Ebright. “The basic problem is that it’s very easy to identify vulnerabilities and far harder to protect against them.”
In the case of altered mousepox, the vulnerability was discovered by accident three years ago by researchers at the Australian National University. While experimenting with vaccines to sterilize mice, they inserted a gene for an immune-system chemical called IL-4 into mousepox, a virus that infects mice. They were surprised to find that the mousepox became extraordinarily virulent, killing 60 percent of vaccinated mice.
Because mousepox is part of the virus family that includes smallpox, the implications were alarming. If smallpox – eradicated as a natural human disease in the 1970s but now feared as a potential bioterrorist weapon – can be similarly engineered to make it overcome vaccination and anti-viral drugs, a terrorist attack could produce a devastating epidemic.
So with funding from the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, Buller set out to see whether he could reproduce the Australians’ super-mousepox and then find a way to cure it. He deliberately created the most deadly mousepox possible, producing a virus that killed all infected mice, even if they were vaccinated and given anti-viral drugs.
“We did additional work to make a hotter virus,” Buller said. “But the goal was to develop therapeutics against the most lethal form of the virus.”
He said he and his colleagues found such a remedy, combining the drug cidofovir with a monoclonal antibody to create “a cocktail that works.”
The proposed collaboration with Army scientists at Fort Detrick would perform some of the same procedures using cowpox, to see if the resulting virus is more deadly and can be blocked using the same drugs. If cowpox behaves like mousepox, chances are the findings would apply to smallpox, too, he said.
Buller believes some press reports of his work have distorted it, hyping the dangers and playing down the search for a cure. “It makes it sound like we’re out of control,” he said.
But biosecurity experts say the flap over Buller’s work underscores the need to create a reliable system for regulating biological research. That was the goal of the recent National Academy of Sciences report.
Gigi Kwik, a fellow of the Baltimore-based Center for Biosecurity of the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, has been interviewing biological scientists as part of an effort to design a system of self-regulation for biodefense research. She has found that, like Buller, they are often perplexed that their work can be seen as threatening.
“There are a lot of powerful technologies out there,” said Kwik, an immunologist. “But only in biology are we playing with the fabric of life.”
Zoonotic monkeypox virus is maintained in a large number of rodent and, to a lesser extent, nonhuman primate species in West and central Africa. Although monkeypox virus was discovered in 1958, the prototypic human cases were not witnessed until the early 1970s. Before this time, it is assumed that infections were masked by smallpox, which was then widely endemic. Nevertheless, since the 1970s, reported monkeypox virus infections of humans have escalated, as have outbreaks with reported human-to-human transmission. This increase is likely due to numerous factors, such as enhanced surveillance efforts, environmental degradation and human urbanization of areas where monkeypox virus is maintained in its animal reservoir(s) and, consequently, serve as a nidus for human infection. Furthermore, viral genetic predispositions enable monkeypox virus to infect many animal species, represented in expansive geographic ranges. Monkeypox virus was once restricted to specific regions of Africa, but its environ has expanded, in one case intercontinentally–suggesting that human monkeypox infections could continue to intensify. As a zoonotic agent, monkeypox virus is far less sensitive to typical eradication measures since it is maintained in wild-animal populations. Moreover, human vaccination is becoming a less viable option to control poxvirus infections in today’s increasingly immunocompromised population, particularly with the emergence of HIV in Sub-Saharan Africa. An increased frequency of human monkeypox virus infections, especially in immunocompromised individuals, may permit monkeypox virus to evolve and maintain itself independently in human populations.
During recent years, there has been growing concern in the US and in other countries about dual use research.1 Much of this has focused on the risk that advances in biotechnology could lead, either inadvertently or deliberately, to the creation of new pathogens more destructive than those that currently exist.This is not a future threat. Research with potentially destructive consequences is already being carried out in university, private sector, and government laboratories around the world. Perhaps the most famous example of such research, and the one that first alerted some scientists and policy-makers to the potential risks from biotechnology research, was the mousepox experiment in Australia. In this work, published in February 2001, researchers trying to develop a means of controlling rodent populations inserted an interleukin-4 gene into the mousepox virus and in so doing created a pathogen that was lethal even to some mice that had been vaccinated against the disease (Jackson et al, 2001). US scientist Mark Buller later built upon this work, producing a mousepox virus so lethal that it killed all of the mice that had been infected, even those that had been both vaccinated and treated with antiviral drugs (MacKenzie, 2003). These projects and others that followed have led to concerns that the introduction of IL-4 into other orthopox viruses (such as smallpox) could have similarly lethal effects.